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Abstract 
In post-Fukushima Japan, the government has presented three scenarios of nuclear power 
reduction (zero nuclear, 15% nuclear, and 20-25% nuclear), of which it has recently selected 
the zero nuclear energy scenario as its preferred option. The choice of energy strategy has 
significant implications for the Asian region as well as domestically. This paper examines 
these scenarios and the energy strategy as a whole with regards to its achievability and 
outcomes. The analysis is based on modeling of the existing energy system of Japan with 
projections based on the government strategy out to the 2030’s. Under all the scenarios, it is 
likely that a small increase in energy security will be obtained, but the achievement of 
environmental commitments is less likely.  The paper points out that, while largely internally 
consistent, the government’s strategy does not consider cross-sectoral policy widely enough. 
A number of alternative integrated policy options are also presented which are proposed to 
enable greater potential for practical achievement of the government’s goals.  Ultimately, it is 
anticipated that an approach which involves much greater integration at domestic (rural-urban 
development), energy system wide (electric vehicle and decentralized energy integration into 
the energy supply grid) and regional (co-operation in development of resources in areas of 
contested ownership) levels, could enhance the energy supply security and stability of the 
region as well as Japan itself.  
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1. Introduction 
The precarious pre-Fukushima community support for nuclear power in Japan has been 
undermined by the disasters of 2011, and a significant rethink of the energy strategy into the 
future has been prompted.  The Japanese government proposed (in June, 2011) three 
alternative energy mix scenarios for public consultation [1] after which (in September, 2011) 
it selected the zero nuclear power option as its preferred scenario – potentially overturning 
around 50 years of pro-nuclear policy.  As this is yet to be formalized in national policy and 
the outcome of the next national election (December 2012) may change the proposed 
scenario, we examine all three options in this study as well as looking more broadly at the 
possibilities and limitations that alternative strategies may entail. 
 
By way of background, this section will examine firstly the current perspectives post-
Fukushima on the implications and potential way forward for Japan, before addressing 
specifically the government’s latest proposals. The current boundary conditions are that 
despite previous policies seeking greater energy security, energy supply in Japan is 96% 
dependent on overseas imports [2], and the price of energy resources is still increasing in 
international markets [3]. The domestic CO2 emissions in Japan have increased by 20% 
compared to 1990 levels in the electricity generation sector up to 2009 [4] despite 
commitments to emissions reductions. On the other hand, the present potential of renewable 
energy is constrained by cost, production rates and system integration challenges [5]. 
 
The overall aim of this paper, beyond the assessment of the proposed scenarios, is to 
highlight key areas needing action, alternative or complementary strategies that could 
successfully achieve the social, economic and environmental goals of Japan.  To do this, we 
draw on background theory in energy systems modeling and design, as well as sustainability 
and resilience – which have been used previously to demonstrate some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of alternative energy systems and technologies [6, 7]. The paper first examines 
the pre-Fukushima energy policy in Japan and the changes that have been made due to the 
accident. The proposed government scenarios are then analysed from the perspective of 
feasibility, using energy system modeling, followed by an analysis of the potential 
implications and likely achievement of outcomes. Finally, some alternative integrated 
approaches are suggested that may improve the outcomes across the energy planning period. 
To put the paper within the context of recent literature, Japan’s energy policy has long been 
of interest, due to the limited resources and the government’s response to various energy 
crises [8-10]. Since the Fukushima nuclear accident, there have been a number of studies 
investigating Japanese energy options from economic [11], energy security [12] and 
economic / environmental [7, 13] perspectives. However, this current study goes further, in 
examining both the underlying technical feasibility and the implications for safety and society. 
Furthermore, it seeks to examine the strategies with regards to both external feasibility and 
internal consistency, which has not been undertaken elsewhere (to the authors’ knowledge).   
 
1.1 Initial impact of Fukushima on energy policy 
The Fukushima accident prompted an initial reaction from policy makers to disallow any 
reactors that had ceased operation (whether due to regular maintenance or in response to the 
earthquake) to restart. The reactors were then required to undertake a “Stress Test” and 
review to identify whether the power plant would be prepared under similar and foreseeable 
natural disasters.  Additional back-up power supply units were also required.  The political 
and corporate unwillingness to force a decision on the potential restart of reactors, and a 
number of scandals, for example misconduct by electric power company executives trying to 
boost support by pushing their employees to attend local community feedback forums, gave 
national politicians some respite from making the difficult decision of how to proceed. There 
has also been an ongoing series of accusations and interrogations of leading government and 
industry figures on their response to the accident and the culture and regulatory mistakes in 
the preceding years. 
 
For a period of some months most utilities were unwilling to press the issue of nuclear start-
up any further, and busied themselves with refurbishment of moth-balled thermal plant and 
purchase of new plant and equipment, as well as securing supply of fossil fuel to cover the 
lack of nuclear power [12]. The utilities also won the right to increase electricity prices due to 
the excess cost of fuel (for example in the Kansai area by 11% for residential and 19% for 
larger users [14]).   
 
During the summer of 2011, it was projected that there would be nationwide power deficits 
due to the lack of nuclear power plants operating in the system. The people of the Tohoku 
and Kanto regions of Japan endured scheduled black-outs and nationally industry and 
institutions took additional or rescheduled holidays in order to reduce peak energy use.  15% 
energy saving targets were set for the whole country - and achieved – with consolidated 
nationwide efforts (no doubt, also assisted by the widespread and largely unrepaired damage 
of the earthquake and tsunami and the exodus of large numbers of foreign workers and 
tourists, and partially due to mild weather conditions) [15].   
 
From the perspective of the anti-nuclear lobbyists, the victory in coping with a summer 
largely without nuclear power was a strong message that nuclear power was unnecessary. 
However, on the back of the natural disasters, the imposition of import bans from Japan by 
other countries concerned about radioactive contamination, the lack of tourists, the increased 
cost of supplying energy and the energy restrictions, the economy suffered (first trade deficit 
in over 30 years, largely due to a $US 58 billion (25.2%) increase in fossil fuel imports [12]). 
Long term, despite the naturally decreasing population of Japan, the cost and restricted 
supply of energy would continue to damage the economy and undoubtedly lead to significant 
social and industrial damage through loss of employment and competitiveness. At present, 
although it is very difficult to assess the ultimate impact on Japan’s nuclear program, the 
Japanese government has released the tentative data of economic loss of the nuclear accident 
and an updated risk cost of nuclear power [16]. Thus the call was renewed by business and 
industry advocates for the restart of nuclear power plants that had been designated as safe.  
An additional concern to the utilities may have been that had the nation survived a second 
summer (this time with no operational nuclear power plants) that the anti-nuclear lobby 
would have been entirely vindicated.  Nonetheless, eventually negotiations between multiple 
levels of government, Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) and local residents 
eventually led to the restart of Oi power plant in July 2012 – prompting an improved outlook 
on energy saving requirements [17].   
 
Further afield, the accident has also had global repercussions for countries considering 
nuclear power or with operating nuclear power plants – although the reactions have been 
significantly different. For example, the United Kingdom, France and the United States of 
America have recommitted to nuclear power [18, 19] while countries such as Germany, 
Switzerland and Italy have rejected it and others such as China have slowed development [19, 
20]. 
1.2 Recent studies on low-carbon energy systems for Japan 
Since Fukushima has brought the urgency of energy policy consideration back to the 
forefront of public and academic discussion, a number of examinations of Japan’s energy 
policy and energy supply options have been published – e.g. [12, 21-24]. These papers have 
raised the potential of largely or entirely renewable energy supplied electricity in Japan.  
Tsuchiya [22] showed that a mix of 75% solar and 25% wind would minimize required 
storage to balance for instability or demand-generation timing differences, while the optimal 
supply was 50% solar, 20% wind and 30% other renewables and back-up power.  These 
figures support previous studies indicating that solar-wind power systems with appropriate 
back-up and storage can provide a significant level of reliability [25].  A number of groups 
have further examined the potential for 80% cuts in emissions by 2050, in line with high-end 
government targets, which they have shown to be achievable with the retention of nuclear 
power, and with the substitution of natural gas for nuclear meaning a 65% cut in emissions 
would be possible [26]. Others have examined the potential for emissions reductions without 
carbon capture and storage or nuclear energy, showing potential by 2100 to be approximately 
50% reduction for Japan without these technologies – only a marginal deficit in regards to the 
government commitments [24].   
 
Without nuclear power, the current emissions per unit of electricity in Japan have already 
risen by around 11% and the cost of energy has started to impact on the economy [23]. The 
question of whether nuclear power can be eliminated from the energy mix is most important 
to the current policy decisions, but it is a multi-faceted problem and the answer derived can 
often be traced back to the underlying assumptions.  This paper will hereafter analyze the 
proposed government strategies as a representative set of future options, extrapolating the 
potential impacts and alternative, synergistic scenarios. 
2. Japanese government strategy 
2.1 Pre-Fukushima energy policy 
A review of Japanese energy policy indicates that in the five decades prior to the Fukushima 
nuclear accident, government strategy was based around the following six key drivers: 
 
1. Energy security – particularly reduction of oil dependence (both with regards to the 
proportion of the energy mix and the sources of supply); 
2. Economic growth and competitiveness – through ensuring cheap supply of energy, 
restructuring industry and support for domestic companies supplying fuel or 
technology 
3. Reduced environmental impacts – targets and regulations on emissions (initially 
local pollutants, more recently GHG emissions) 
4. Nuclear energy promotion – as a partial solution to import energy dependence and 
selected environmental impacts 
5. Efficient and effective utilization of energy – as a means of maintaining each of the 
first three points 
6. Technology solutions – while some management policies and socio-behavioural 
policies have been implemented, most of the energy supply and conservation 
strategies have been technologically based. 
 
These drivers are not mutually exclusive, but highlight the key areas that have absorbed both 
political focus and investment. The accident at Fukushima has prompted a revision of the 
energy strategy, but it will be seen that many of these drivers are still in place.  
 
2.2 “Options for Energy and the Environment” 
In June (2011), the government released a document for discussion, entitled “Options for 
Energy and the Environment” [1].  This document first introduces the pre-Fukushima energy 
strategy then presents key guiding principles (discussed in detail in Section 4) and finally 
three energy scenarios based on different nuclear power development strategies and some 
analysis of these scenarios.  The proposed “viewpoints” and “perspectives” that act as 
guiding principles all echo previous energy policy, with perhaps two major changes: a focus 
on decentralization and liberalization of energy supply and on the “green development” 
strategy that has been adopted elsewhere in the world in recent times.  We will return to these 
points later on in the analysis. 
 
The three scenarios that are presented for the shift in energy mix out to 2030 are outlined in 
Table 1. The energy mix as of 2010 and the assumed mix in each scenario out to 2030 is 
shown in Figure 1.  One notable deviation from the pre-Fukushima government energy 
forecast is that each of these scenarios requires around 10% reduction in overall energy 
consumption, as opposed to the original plan of 10% increase.  The government predicts each 
of these scenarios to achieve between 15 and 25% reduction of GHG emissions by 2030, and 
to have only minor impact on the economy, although these may largely be attributed to the 
specific set of assumptions prescribed by the government when it tendered-out the analysis.  
  
Table 1: Outline of the three proposed energy scenarios [1] 
Scenarios Key points 
1 Zero nuclear power 
 Rapidly reduce the share of nuclear energy  
 Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel. 
 Renewable energy and fossil fuels 
 Focus on energy efficiency (also applies to scenarios 2 and 3) 
2 15% nuclear power 
 Smooth reduction of dependence on nuclear and fossil fuels 
 Reprocessing and/or direct disposal of nuclear fuel 




 Slowly reduce but maintain dependence on nuclear energy  
 New nuclear power plants are required 
 Reprocessing and/or direct disposal of nuclear fuel  
 Promote reduction of dependence on fossil fuels from an 
economic standpoint 
 Strong public confidence in nuclear energy and administration 
essential. 
 
 Figure 1: Electricity generation mix in 2030 for the proposed alternative scenarios (after [1]) 
Examining the required electricity generation under the given scenarios by source (Figure 1) 
shows that the main constraint in capacity is the renewable energy component – which has to 
increase its output approximately three-fold in order to fulfill any of the proposed strategies.  
Coal generation overall will decrease, although there may be replacement of old plants with 
newer, more efficient ones and gas must expand its output marginally or decrease slightly.  
Notably, under the government’s scenarios, oil usage would increase under the zero nuclear 
scenario, although this could potentially be replaced by natural gas. 
2.3 “Innovative strategy for energy and the environment” 
Subsequent to the national “deliberative polling” exercise on the “Options for energy and 
environment”, the government released its policy statement the “Innovative strategy for 
energy and the environment” [27] which highlighted the non-nuclear scenario as the preferred 
option. This strategy is underpinned by five policy “pillars”: 
1. Realization of a society not dependent on nuclear power 
2. Realization of a green energy revolution 
3. Ensuring stable supply of energy 
4. Bold implementation of reform of electricity power systems 
5. Steady implementation of global warming countermeasures. 
 
As this “Innovative strategy” is effectively a detailed version of the earlier zero nuclear 
scenario, we will treat it as such in the foregoing analysis, but use the additional detail in the 
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3. Evaluation of the proposed scenarios 
In order to clearly understand the implications of these alternative scenarios, in this section 
we review the options from various perspectives that shed some light on the potential for 
each scenario to contribute to improved sustainability of the Japanese energy system. These 
scenarios have been assessed (both in the government’s own development process and by 
independent authors) from the perspective of their theoretical achievability and their impact 
on greenhouse gas emissions and direct economic performance [1, 28].  Broadly, the 
scenarios fit within the range of possibility of technologies as presented elsewhere – e.g. [7, 
21, 25, 29, 30] – however, it is important to highlight some of the constraints and 
assumptions that must be made in order to achieve the government’s proposed scenarios.  
Thus this section first provides an overview of the constraints on the technological 
achievability then focuses largely on the outputs and outcomes – specifically identifying 
weaknesses in other aspects of society and the economy that may or may not be supported by 
the alternative energy scenarios. 
 
3.1 Constraints on technical achievability 
 
Land area is one key constraint in Japan – and in particular, suitable land area for renewable 
energy (typically diffuse) given that around 66% of the country is forested, and much of that 
is mountainous [31]. However, theoretically, covering 20% of all urban and industrial areas 
(buildings only, not roads) with PV panels, at a low efficiency of 10%, would be sufficient at 
average daily insolation [32] to generate the full 350 TWh required from renewables in the 
government’s zero nuclear scenarios (although this must be considered further with regards to 
the disruption to the grid and matching with demand).  Wind power potential has also been 
demonstrated to be sufficient for more than its required share [22, 25, 29], while hydropower 
potential is unable to be expanded significantly as it has already been close to fully-utilized 
[32]. 
 
Beyond the physical limitation, one of the major restrictions on expansion is the limitation in 
production capacity – the scenarios for 2030 predict an increase of around 20 times the 
current installed capacity of both wind power and PV.  Estimates are that Japan can produce 
between 4 and 5 GW of PV cells domestically on an annual basis, making the PV target 
achievable (if the entire domestic production is put to use domestically), while the wind 
turbine purchase or production and installation potential is also estimated to be viable (see 
Table 2).   Therefore the technical limitation is found to be consistent, although it may stretch 
the limits of capacity. Auxiliary equipment limitations such as batteries and transmission 
lines are not included, which is likely to make the scenarios a little less easy to achieve. 
 
Table 2: Renewable energy potential in Japan [30] 
Source Potential Capacity Factor 
Generated electricity 
(TWh) 
Hydro  21 GWe  35%  64 
PV  100 GWp  12%  105 
Wind  100 GWp  20%  175 
Biomass 2 GWe 50%-90% 12 
GWe: Gigawatts Electricity, GWp: Gigawatts Peak 
 
Maintaining nuclear power in the mix, under the 15% and 20% scenarios is also an important 
technical consideration. One of the exacerbating factors in the safety of nuclear power in 
Japan particularly is the prevalence of earthquakes. In the Fukushima accident, the 
subsequent massive tsunami also played a major role in disabling the plant cooling system.  
We considered two options for achieving the reduction of nuclear power gradually, to 
enhance safety of the overall system.  The first scenario (Option 1) assumes that nuclear 
power plants are allowed to come back online after passing the newly-legislated safety 
checks, but that they are retired when they reach their nominal lifetime of 40 years.  The 
second scenario (Option 2) assumes that on top of the rules for Option 1, no nuclear power 
plants situated on the pacific coast (where the potential for large tsunamis is greater than on 
the Japan Sea coast) are allowed to return to operation. Both scenarios assume that the 
government’s planned reduction in electricity demand from 1.1 to 1 trillion TWh is achieved 
linearly from 2012 onwards through to 2030. Assuming that the second scenario applies to 
existing plants, but that all currently proposed plants are constructed close to schedule (for 
plants on the Japan Sea coast) would give Option 3.  The government’s “Innovative strategy” 
[27] would effectively involve the choice of Option 1 or Option 2. 
 
In order to plot the graphs under these options, the data on nuclear power plant construction 
dates (historical and proposed) and the nominal generating capacity was obtained from 
elsewhere (e.g. [33]), and a simple correlation to the 40 year lifetime was applied. The 
resulting installed capacity and percentage contribution to electricity supply for the three 
options are shown in Figure 2 (assuming a constant capacity factor equal to the existing 
nuclear fleet)
2
.  This shows that a conservative approach to reducing nuclear power risk over 
a 20 year period would lead to the government’s proposed 15% scenario being achieved.  The 
20-25% scenario could only be achieved by either allowing the operation of plants beyond 
their 40 year lifetime, by allowing new construction on the Pacific coast, or by accelerating 
the construction of new plants.  In order to naturally reduce the nuclear power generation to 
zero, the time period would be need to be extended out to beyond 2040. 
 
 
Figure 2: Natural phase-out of nuclear power installed capacity and contribution to electricity generation (%) 
One key aspect not shown in this graph is the uneven distribution of nuclear power plants that 
would be decommissioned under the proposed options.  In the Tokyo, Chubu and Tohoku 
Electric Power Company jurisdictions, most of the power plants would be shut down - 
particularly in Option 2 and 3 – which would lead to an uneven distribution in power deficit 
due to the lack of interconnection between the western and eastern electricity grids.   
3.2 Potential outcomes - Safety  
In the proposed electricity system scenarios, the nuclear power safety was evaluated using the 
dependence ratio on nuclear power in the energy mix as the only metric. Notwithstanding the 
                                                 
2 The TWh produced per GW capacity is therefore equal across the period, and the TWh produced from 
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progress in nuclear energy safety and the critical importance of geographic distribution, this 
is perhaps a reasonable indicator. However, nuclear power safety must ultimately cover more 
than just the generation of electricity – the remainder of the fuel cycle, and the 
decommissioning of current facilities is also important. At present, there is approximately 
20,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel stored inside nuclear power plants or interim storage 
facilities in Japan [34]. The management and disposal of the spent nuclear fuel requires 
nuclear power experts, various advanced technologies and significant financial support. 
While the government scenarios acknowledge this in the “three viewpoints”, if nuclear power 
is to be phased out, it will require a concerted effort to encourage and maintain the level of 
skills and knowledge required for the task of maintaining nuclear waste safety.  This 
necessity is highlighted in the “Innovative strategy”, with a government commitment to 
promoting research and development on reprocessing as well as a consultative process to find 
an appropriate storage place for spent fuel [27]. 
3.3 Potential outcomes - Energy Security 
Renewable energy provides the only major potential for domestic energy security in Japan. 
Therefore, the use of the largest possible share of renewables in Japan is the only option that 
can lead to energy security in a “pure” sense of the term, while the use of nuclear power and 
the ownership, control or contracted purchase of foreign resources and companies may 
constitute secondary options (but under a compromised definition of energy security).  
 
Apart from renewable energy, the proposed scenarios will continue to require imports of 
fossil fuels – slightly less gas in all scenarios, much less coal and a range of around +/- 50% 
in the rate of oil consumption (greater for the lower nuclear scenarios). If oil is phased out, 
then the increase in natural gas consumption will be equivalent to around 50% of current 
consumption. Japanese companies have recently been taking majority shares in many LNG 
projects globally, and have large shares in coal resources in countries such as Australia, 
fitting the secondary definition of energy security. The availability and cost of gas are likely 
to improve through the expansion of shale gas production in the United States. It is arguable 
that a diverse portfolio of energy sources and generation options is likely to improve the 
resilience of the energy system in case of disaster; however, the level of dependence on 
imported resources would ideally be as low as possible [6]. 
 
If a 30-35% share of renewables in total electricity generation is achieved, then the level of 
energy dependence will certainly decrease – although perhaps only to around 85% of energy 
being imported.  Without a major move away from fossil fuels (especially oil) in other sectors, 
the energy security problem will still remain as a significant vulnerability. 
 
3.4 Potential outcomes - Environment 
In the published three scenarios, 16-25% CO2 emission reductions was claimed to be realized 
in the whole power generation system [1], however applying two alternative models (one 
static model based on the proposed total generation by source, and one hour-by-hour 
simulation [30]) this was not reproducible – thus it is assumed that the government is relying 
on a significant amount of offsetting from investment in overseas clean development 
mechanism projects to earn emissions reduction credits. Using advanced, highly efficient 
fossil fuel technology, the 0% scenario cannot reduce CO2 emissions compared to the 290 
million tonnes that represent the 1990 level as shown in Table 3.  This is apparent even when 
we compare the phase-out of all oil-based generation and its substitution with natural gas. 
The only way that reductions could be achieved in this scenario is to introduce a significant 
level of carbon capture and storage (CCS).  CCS is not yet fully-proven, and there is little 
indication of its technical feasibility or public acceptability in Japan as yet, so it is unlikely to 
be a near-term solution. The 15% scenario is only a marginal improvement, while the 20-25% 
nuclear scenarios may achieve around 15% reduction in emissions. Thus, it would appear 
unlikely that the environmental benefits (at least on the global warming metric) would be 
significant.  
 
Table 3:CO2 emissions in the power generation sector in the three scenarios 









322 (+11%) 282 (-3%) 246 (-15%) 238 (-18%) 
Static model 330 (+14%) 275 (-5%) 246 (-15%) 
Static model (no oil in mix) 290 (-0%) 243 (-14%) 233 (-20%) 
 
From the perspective of natural resources, the requirement for rare metals, rare earth metals 
and other materials would increase. For example, it has been estimated that around 15% of 
rare earth-based permanent magnets are used in wind turbines and another 15% in 
automobiles [35] – a switch to higher use of electric vehicles, hybrids and wind power would 
require increased usage of such materials, with production having been limited in recent years 
due to Chinese export restrictions. Though spaced out over a period of 15-20 years, the 
availability of these key materials may be a restricting factor (physically or economically) on 
achieving the government energy scenarios. 
 
3.5 Review from the Social Perspective 
From the perspective of benefit or impact on society, the scenarios hold variable and 
uncertain potential. We will consider here a number of potential areas of impact – the 
potential to impact on quality of life, the change in industry structure and subsequent 
employment implications. 
 
In 2005 there were approximately 10,570 employees in the nuclear industry in Japan [36]. 
While this is not perhaps excessively large (only 0.016% of the total labor force), it 
represents 3.1% of all employees in the “electricity, gas, heat supply and water” sector [37]. 
Reducing this direct source of employment, as well as the flow-on jobs in local communities 
would be expected to have a mild negative impact nationally, but an acute impact locally.  
Likewise, the additional loss of jobs in coal-fired power plants would negatively impact. 
These reductions may be made up elsewhere in the energy industry or in manufacturing 
expansion to produce and install the needed infrastructure for renewable energy, but the 
balance is uncertain. It is apparent that most renewable energy technologies do not employ 
high numbers of people in their operational phase (geothermal and biofuels being exceptions), 
but there could be significant boost during the construction period [38].  If the technologies 
being promoted most widely were geothermal and biofuel, the job losses may not be as 
significant, as the labor intensity in generation is close to equivalent with other thermal 
technologies such as coal and nuclear (especially when the mining of fuel does not occur 
locally). 
 
Quality of life (QoL) is difficult to measure effectively, or to estimate on the scale of a 
country without going into excessive detail.  The “Human Development Index” of the United 
Nations Development Program [39] utilizes Gross National Income (GNI) per capita as a 
proxy for QoL, although here by way of example we use the similar indicator GDP which 
was the initial indicator used in the HDI, although it is certainly the subject of criticism [40].  
It is likely that, with no significant shift in fertility rates or immigration policy, the population 
of Japan will have declined by around 9-12 million people from its current level of 127.8 
million [37, 41]. Under the government’s tendered modeling [1], the zero nuclear scenario 
produces a lower increase in real GDP over the period, but still enables growth – hence all 
scenarios (using total real GDP / population as the indicator) would indicate an increase in 
quality of life.  
 
On a direct scale, electricity costs account for approximately 3.3% of total monthly 
household expenditure, with energy in total accounting for around 5.7% [37]. Not including 
the potential for natural gas costs to increase, if the cost of electricity to residential users is to 
approximately double (as shown in the government modeling), then household energy usage 
will account for around 9% of expenditure, with 6.6% being due to electricity.  This direct 
impact may be reduced somewhat through the improvement in efficiency that is being sought 
– and it has been demonstrated that at least 15% is achievable without new technology.  The 
cost of “embodied energy” in domestically produced goods and services may however, 
impact more dramatically.  
4. Analysis of internal consistency 
The potential outcomes and indicators of achievability that were addressed in the previous 
section are important factors in determining the overall value of the proposed government 
scenarios. However, it is also important to examine whether the proposed scenarios are 
internally consistent.  In particular, the government’s “Options for Energy and the 
Environment” puts forth “three viewpoints to promote drastic energy structure reforms that 
need to be addressed whatever options are chosen” and “four important perspectives in 
choosing energy options” [1] (refer Table 4 and Table 5). These “viewpoints” and 
“perspectives” were used as an empirical tool for comparing the internal consistency of the 
alternative scenarios proposed. The resulting analysis is discussed below.  
 
 
Table 4: The “three viewpoints” laid out by the government [1] 
Three viewpoints to promote drastic energy structure reforms 
1. Shifting to clean energy sources and securing 
green growth 
a. Shift the energy structure to renewable energy, clean energy (hydrogen and storage 
system, etc.), and energy conservation 
b. Promote consumption and investment, and accelerate green innovation and investments 
in next-generation energy networks while sharing ambitious goals (increasing the share of 
renewable energy to over 25-30% and reducing energy consumption by 10% from current 
level by 2030) 
c. Draw up the Framework for Green Development Policy and promote regulatory reform 
and support for development in an integrated manner, and use them as the basis of 
Japan’s revival. 
2. Reforming the energy system led by 
demand side actors 
a. Convert to a new distributed energy system under which each citizen can choose their 
own energy sources as a consumer / producer. 
b. Implement energy / electric power systems reform as a priority area. 
3. Multifaceted international contribution 
for energy and the environmental field. 
a. Converting structures toward clean energy development and further innovation in energy 
efficiency will serve as a basis for Japan to share its challenges with emerging countries 
and to promote multifaceted international contribution in the fields of energy / the 
environment. This will also offer a model for solving global warming. 
b. In light of the experience of the TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident, Japan 
will fulfill its responsibility as a country using nuclear power for peaceful purposes by 
controlling nuclear power risks, improving nuclear safety, undertaking decontamination, 
and managing decommissioned reactors through securing human resources / 
technological basis. 
c. Share our experiences in and lessons learned from the accident with other countries. 
 
Table 5: The "four important perspectives" proposed by the government [1] 
Four important perspectives in choosing energy options 
1. Securing nuclear safety and reducing future risks 
(The current prime challenge is to secure social safety 
and security in a sustainable manner) 
a. By minimizing risk through the implementation of thorough safety measures and 
reducing the amounts of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the burden on 
future generations should be reduced. At the same time, technologies and human 
resources for ensuring nuclear safety need to be secured and developed. 
b. Based on the above, a roadmap to reduce dependence on nuclear energy needs to 
be framed. 
2. Strengthening energy security 
(Amidst the uncertainty in the global energy situation 
and the prospects for securing alternative energy, strong 
demand for energy security remains unchanged.) 
a. The roadmap to reduce dependence on nuclear energy needs to be framed in a 
form that is compatible with both energy security and the diversification of 
energy sources. 
3. Contributing to the solution of global 
warming 
(Efforts to reduce domestic CO2 emissions must be 
continued in the course of carrying out measures to 
reduce dependence on nuclear energy.) 
a. The current goal for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions includes sinks and 
those gained through international contributions in addition to the reduction of 
domestic emissions. How should the balance between them be considered? 
b. Japan needs to contribute to solving the global warming issue, including reducing 
CO2 emissions overseas by utilizing Japan’s advanced technology. 
4. Restraining costs and preventing hollowing-
out of industry. 
(Efforts should be made to avoid the situation where 
industry and employment are hollowed-out as a result of 
the energy mix conversion) 
a. The roadmap to reduce dependence on nuclear energy should be shaped from the 
perspective of avoiding the hollowing-out of industry and employment as a result 
of the energy mix conversion, by looking closely into the impact of the increase in 
energy costs on industry and economy as well as on social changes. 
 4.1  Consistency with the “Viewpoints”  
4.1.1 Shifting to clean energy sources and securing green growth 
While the scenarios are all relatively consistent in regards to this viewpoint (they all require 
significant investment in renewables and reduce the overall dependence on fossil fuels), the 
stated aim of promoting “support for development in an integrated manner” would seem to be 
lacking in consideration beyond the economic-environmental/energy linkage with renewables.  
No concrete policies are promoted to integrate across sectors or regions of the economy. 
4.1.2 Reforming the energy system led by demand side actors 
This viewpoint is perhaps the least consistent with the presented scenarios, although it 
presents a high potential opportunity to bring real market change.  Converting “to a new 
distributed energy system under which each citizen can choose their own energy sources as a 
consumer / producer” fits well with the promotion of household photovoltaic systems. 
However, there are severe practical restrictions – such as the large percentage (42% in 2007) 
of apartment-type accommodation with neither space nor capacity to install such systems [37]. 
Furthermore, while market liberalization
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 has been attempted in the past [42], it has yet to be 
successfully achieved, and would require particularly strong action to enable residential 
consumers to have an open choice of energy service provider (currently there is only one 
electricity provider per major region, and these companies are vertically integrated from 
generation through to retail). 
 
The other key element to enhance the benefits and potential of these scenarios would be the 
shifting of the current separated grid system to a single frequency (at present eastern Japan 
uses a 50Hz system and western Japan uses a 60Hz system, which prevents easy transfer of 
energy from one side to the other) [23]. 
 
4.1.3 Multifaceted international contribution for energy and the environmental field 
The apparent need for Japan to claim carbon offsets from overseas in order to come close to 
achieving its emissions reduction targets is one element of the scenarios that supports this 
viewpoint. Although there is no solid proposal, perhaps the weakest element of this point is 
the “controlling nuclear power risks”, which may falter under a low nuclear scenario due to a 
lack of human resources. The scenarios have used the dependence on nuclear energy as the 
one indicator of nuclear power risk (which is arguably correct), however the remaining 
nuclear waste and the inevitable decline in nuclear specialists would be a concerning effect 
driving in the opposing direction. 
                                                 
3 “Liberalization” here describes the process of allowing more generators into the electricity sector in 
order to allow customers the choice of retail electricity suppliers rather than monopoly suppliers as is 
currently the case – ultimately this is expected to encourage cost competition. 
 4.2 Consistency with the “Important Perspectives”  
4.2.1 Securing nuclear safety and reducing future risks 
Following on from the third “viewpoint”, this perspective restates the need for a structured 
withdrawal from nuclear power and maintaining technology and human resources. To 
reiterate, the lack of firm policies and financial committment on this is likely to result in the 
opposite. Moreover, the leading technology edge that Japan has as a supplier of key nuclear 
technology is likely to suffer and enhance negative GDP effects. 
 
4.2.2 Strengthening energy security 
Energy security remains an issue for Japan, and despite the enhanced level of renewable 
energy in the proposed scenarios it is likely to remain a significant issue. However, all of the 
proposed scenarios will undoubtedly promote greater energy security.  One important 
element of the reduction in nuclear power may be the refocus on energy security as domestic-
only energy production rather than the current interpretation that includes nuclear and 
Japanese-owned foreign resources.  This perspective could also be applied to facilitate the 
acceptance of shared-ownership of disputed territories and resources that are currently 
causing tensions between China, Japan, Russia and Korea.   
 
4.2.3 Contributing to the solution of global warming 
As demonstrated, it was found to be unlikely that the proposed government scenarios would 
reduce emissions by the proposed amounts, thereby leading to the conclusion that significant 
offshore offsets would be required.  It is therefore difficult to say that these scenarios are 
consistent with this perspective, although with a phasing out of coal and oil, there could 
certainly be significant progress. 
 
4.2.4 Restraining costs and preventing hollowing-out of industry 
This perspective is difficult to achieve in reality. Even though the proposal of industry 
support for expanding renewable energy and energy efficiency may assist, if the price of 
electricity doubles, many industries will find difficulty in remaining competitive 
internationally. Already, in previous decades, Japan has seen the off-shoring of energy and 
labor-intensive industries through government and industry policy decisions [43]. A lack of 
integrated policy planning is likely to further exacerbate such pressures, as would the likely 
diminishing of nuclear technology competitiveness. Contrasting with this, is the focus on the 
technology production side of renewable energy systems, which may prevent the loss of 
manufacturing industries to some extent. 
5. Alternative and complementary strategies 
The government’s strategies treat the non-energy sector and associated policies as largely 
separate from the energy scenarios themselves, although they acknowledge the need to shield 
industry and households from the unwanted impacts and to engage industry in providing the 
solutions needed.  This section examines a number of areas where policy could take an 
integrated approach, incorporating other sectoral and social concerns. These strategies are not 
necessarily new, but given the need for a different direction in such a fundamental area as 
energy, it would be worthwhile even to re-examine such options. 
5.1 Rural renewal and renewable industries 
One of the major social dilemmas that Japan faces (like many modern countries) is the 
constant process of urbanization leaving rural areas with declining populations, economies 
and dilapidated infrastructure.  Nuclear energy subsidies have been one key element in 
supporting the infrastructure in such communities, but with the nuclear power phase-out this 
source of income would be gone.  However, when considered from the perspective of self-
sufficiency, it is apparent that rural areas are more likely to possess potential for independent 
and sustainable systems, due largely to lower population density and higher available 
resource per capita [44]. The lower population density in rural areas would make them prime 
locations for installation of large renewable energy facilities. In Japan, the “Eco-Model Cities 
Project” is one wide-scale demonstration that includes a focus on rural cities and may, on a 
broader scale, be applied to enact an integrated plan for a sustainable Japanese economy [45]. 
Such an approach would be particularly relevant in areas that have been hardest hit by the 
natural and nuclear disasters of 2011, which have effectively been given an opportunity for 
broad-scale remodeling and adoption of the latest approaches to sustainable living. 
 
The use of biomass in energy supply is one attractive model that would boost the economic 
situation of rural areas.  Waste biomass is used widely already. However, there still remains 
an untapped resource that might offer at least a small energy supply potential [46]. With some 
estimates that waste forestry products of around 20 million m
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  may be available to provide 
energy [31]. This would be equal to about 156 PJ of thermal energy, or at 35% efficiency, 
around 15.2 TWh of electricity – a significant amount if it was collected effectively.  
However, beyond just waste biomass, it would be feasible for Japan to initiate a sustainable 
biomass harvesting system, based on tree cropping. An additional synergy in this case is that 
Japanese cedar pollen allergy is becoming a serious health issue affecting the ability of 
around 25 million people (approximately 20% of the population) across the country to live 
and work effectively for two months of the year [47].  This public health issue has arisen 
largely due to the widespread planting of Japanese cedar post-World War II as building 
material for construction [47].  By cropping the approximately 40% of Japanese plantation 
forests in a sustainable way, while concurrently continuing the reduction of Japanese cedar 
and other allergenic trees in the mix, a significant synergistic energy and health scenario 
could be achieved. This scenario would also benefit the economy from higher productivity 
and lower health costs, as well as assisting in the revival of forestry and subsequently rural 
areas.   
5.2 Regional partnership and stability 
The third area of integrated strategy for developing a more resilient new energy structure 
would be to engage in collaborative projects with neighbouring countries.  The government 
strategy focuses largely on implementing Japanese technologies overseas with only a brief 
discussion on building direct and bi-directional collaboration.  The bilateral agreements that 
have been discussed in the “Innovative strategy” rely on securing resources from fuel 
producing countries – a strategy that is important, but has also underpinned much of Japan’s 
past energy policy. However, there are apparent opportunities for building both greater 
security of energy supply and at the same time taking a step towards finally easing tensions 
between Japan and its neighbours. 
 
Alternative strategies for energy security in Japan have been mooted for many years, but 
much of this has gained momentum through the advance of technologies such as high voltage 
direct current (HVDC) transmission lines and expansion of the LNG trade.  Some of the 
major strategies have involved electricity grid connection with the Asian mainland [48] or 
importing Russian oil and LNG [49].  Most of these strategies suffer from the need for strong 
cooperation between parties that are currently involved in long term territorial disputes.  
However, through the government and industry taking a positive step to share resources that 
are largely the contentious issue regarding such territories, then a mutually-beneficial solution 
would emerge, which could alleviate energy supply concerns for both Japan and other 
emerging nations of ASEAN. Japan may be forced to give up or share some of its physical 
territory, but in exchange could obtain access to greater energy supplies from sub-sea oil and 
gas deposits or from continental fuel and electricity supply.  Ultimately this would also 
produce a significant vulnerability to international conflicts, but given an associated 
improvement in bilateral relationships the potential provocations are likely to abate to some 
extent. 
5.3 Integrated energy storage and cross-sectoral emissions reduction 
The final integrated strategy considered here is the expansion of the government’s current 
limited consideration of energy to include other sectors. For example, the transportation 
sector is the largest consumer of oil, and significant gains could be made through ongoing 
efficiency, by reducing demand or by switching to alternative energy sources.  One example 
of this cross-sectoral strategy that has been discussed elsewhere is the use of high-efficiency 
heat pumps for hot water in the residential and commercial sectors, and electric vehicles in 
the transportation sector as storage for excess electricity [21].  The advantage of such a 
strategy is that it would enable load shifting and smoothing of the supply curve that has been 
widely discussed as a limitation for renewable energy. Electricity as the only end-use source 
of energy may however, be undesirable, as it is likely to introduce excessive vulnerability in 
the energy system. However, as an opportunity to expand renewable energy use and 
concurrently reduce emissions across various sectors, it should be explored.  Furthermore, 
Japanese electric vehicle and hybrid vehicle makers have a significant market presence, 
which could be expanded and provide economic stimulus. 
5.4 Consistency with the “viewpoints” and “perspectives” 
It can be argued that these three (although admittedly general) alternative strategies – 
especially if applied in combination – would be consistent with the viewpoints and 
perspectives raised by the government.  They would explicitly support the shift to clean 
energy, green growth, reform to engage demand side actors and international collaboration 
that are the basis of the “viewpoints”. Moreover, they would be likely to address the 
“perspectives” of enhancing energy security, preventing the hollowing-out of industry and 
contributing to global warming abatement. They do not directly address the issues of nuclear 
safety and restraining costs, but as complementary strategies, they could add significantly to 
solutions that make the achievement of these goals possible. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented an analysis of the Japanese government’s energy scenarios 
from the stand-point of their achievability and consequences. We have also presented some 
alternative or complementary strategies that have not explicitly been considered in the 
government’s plans. The Japanese government’s post-Fukushima energy plan has tried to 
shift towards a non-nuclear scenario. However, of the three presented scenarios, the non-
nuclear scenario is not necessarily the most likely to succeed in attaining either the safety, 
environmental or economic performance that the country desires. On the other hand, energy 
security will definitely improve, but is not likely to drop to less than 85% dependence on 
imports unless territorial disputes can be solved amicably to obtain rapid access to offshore 
resources. Integrated scenarios would be likely to provide ultimately more sustainable 
solutions for energy supply in Japan and Asia generally, although the current limited 
solutions considered by the government are technically feasible.   
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